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I. INTRODUCTION
In the small city of Central Falls, Rhode Island, people in the commu-
nity suddenly began to disappear: a leader of a Roman Catholic Church
prayer group, a second grader’s father, and a janitor at the courthouse.1
The distraught families found their missing family members days later in
a completely isolated universe; cut off from the world, yet only blocks
from their homes.2  This isolated universe, the Wyatt Detention Facility,
that was seen by the Central Falls community as an “economic engine”
that brought jobs and much needed federal funds into the small city of
19,000, became a prison to these individuals incarcerated in an effort to
round-up undocumented immigrants.3
The main purpose of the facility was to house people charged with felo-
nies; however, surprisingly, this jail also held hundreds of people who
were not felons, including many who had not been charged with a crime.
But the individuals above—like prayer group leader Maynor Cante´ who
was detained in 2007—are bystanders caught in the crossfire of the recent
immigration crackdown.4  Cante´ worked two jobs and spent thousands of
dollars attempting to legalize his immigration status, only to be swept up
by immigration officers on his way to work and taken to the Wyatt De-
tention Facility.5  What happened to the small community of Central Falls
when people like Cante´ began disappearing?  Local businesses lost
1. Nina Bernstein, Dependent on Jail, City of Immigrants Fills Jail Cells with its Own,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at A1 (discussing the devastating impact of “immigration crack-
down” on a small community).
2. Id.
3. Id.  The people of Central Falls saw Wyatt as the economic savior of the city, a
source of jobs and federal funds. Id.  Initially, the jail was intended to house federal in-
mates, but to help pay off the cost of its construction, Wyatt looked to make money on
prisoners like Mr. Cante´—“administrative detainees not charged with a crime, but held
while the government tries to deport them.” Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
He ended up one of 2,000 detainees packed into a windowless tent city that had
sprung up only a year earlier in Raymondville, Tex[as]—the nation’s largest immigra-
tion prison camp, run for profit and still growing.
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crowds of customers and many people went into hiding.6  This aggressive
immigration crackdown that began with a story about one distraught fam-
ily quickly escalated to become a disturbing reality for the entire Central
Falls community7  effecting the town emotionally and economically.
What would happen if all illegal immigrants suddenly disappeared like
Cante´?  The devastating impact of lost tax revenues and the reduced la-
bor market on the U.S. economy would be the equivalent of eliminating
the entire population of Pennsylvania, and could easily cause one of the
biggest economic disasters in American history.8
Undocumented immigrants contribute to the economy through con-
sumption, taxes, and the labor market and are especially helpful to small
businesses trying to hold down labor costs.9  For example, economists be-
For weeks after his lawyer reopened his case for a hearing in Boston, she could not
locate him.  He was on the verge of deportation by the time she managed to persuade
the government to fly him back from Texas, two days before last Christmas.
Mr. Cante´ finally appeared before an immigration judge on Jan[uary] 2, after three
months in the detention maze.  Because his case fell under the more lenient laws in
force before 1997, he not only was released on bond, but allowed to work until his
immigration hearing in December 2009.  He is now trying to pay back thousands of
dollars in loans and legal fees.
Id.
6. Bernstein, supra note 1.
In Central Falls, the crackdown sowed panic.  At the public charter school two blocks
from Wyatt, parents, already afraid to be photographed at school events, were now
reluctant to drive to meetings, said Sarah Friedman, a founder of the school.
An [eight]-year-old girl, one of the school’s high-scoring students, stopped speaking in
class when her father disappeared into detention, the girl’s mother said.  Without his
income, mother and daughter, United States citizens, were almost evicted from their
apartment.
At Central Falls High School, some students stopped coming to class because their
families had gone into hiding, said Margie Cruz, a school-home liaison: “The child was




8. Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Examining the Need For a Guest Worker Pro-
gram Before the S. Judciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Mayor Michael
Bloomberg), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg30254/html/CHRG-
109shrg30254.htm [hereinafter Bloomberg].
9. See Is the Legalization of Illegal Aliens a Good Solution to Illegal Immigration in
America?, PROCON.ORG, http://immigration.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=
001362 (last updated Sept. 7, 2010); Gene Cubbison, Illegal Immigrant Costs, Benefits Dis-
puted, NBC SAN DIEGO (May 3, 2010), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/politics/Illegal-
Immigrant-Costs-Benefits-Disputed—92549134.html (discussing that the costs of illegal
immigration do not outweigh the benefits and emphasizing that the immigrant labor force
is crucial for small businesses).
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lieve that the San Diego tourist industry “could not exist in anything near
its present form without undocumented immigrants” and have said that
undocumented immigrants “add an element of . . . entrepreneurial activ-
ity to the economy.”10  With these stark statistics and economic predic-
tions, it is difficult to ignore the parallel between the crackdown on
immigration and the current economic downfall.
Is it possible to keep enjoying the economic benefits undocumented
immigrants bring to the United States while simultaneously eliminating
the costs?  Looking at the big picture, the solution seems simple.  Since
the majority of the cost of undocumented immigration comes from
healthcare, education, and social security, why not just let the undocu-
mented immigrants pay into the system and give them the same rights as
legal immigrants?11  In order to address this issue in an adequate manner,
it is important to focus on two of the main problems with the creation of a
social support system funded by undocumented immigrants: (1) how to
deal with the current economic costs of these immigrants already in the
United States, and (2) how to proceed in the future.
The first issue pertaining to economic costs of currently present un-
documented immigrants in the United States was previously addressed
during the Reagan Era through the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA).12  IRCA gave undocumented aliens in the United States
an opportunity to legalize their status and enjoy the same benefits availa-
ble to documented immigrants.13  Segrereo Mendez was one of three mil-
lion unauthorized immigrants who took advantage of this amnesty
opportunity.14  She is now a U.S. citizen who has worked a tough manual
labor job in the garment industry for the past twenty-seven years while
10. Cubbison, supra note 9.
11. See Is the Legalization of Illegal Aliens a Good Solution to Illegal Immigration in
America?, supra note 9; See generally Fed. for Am. Immigration Reform, The Cost of Im-
migration, FAIRUS.ORG, http://www.fairus.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=16980&
security=1601&news_iv_ctrl=1017 (last updated July 2003) (outlining general costs of
immigration).
12. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359;
see Jerry Kammer, The Road to IRCA, June 1986, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES BLOG (June
29, 2011), http://cis.org/kammer/irca-25-years (“In November of 1986, President Ronald
Reagan signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which offered
amnesty to millions of illegal immigrants and established sanctions for employers who
hired those not authorized to work in the country.”).
13. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
14. Steven Thrasher, Ronald Reagan Immigration Amnesty 25 Years Later, MIAMI
NEW TIMES (July 15, 2010), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2010-07-15/news/ronald-rea-
gan-immigration-amnesty-25-years-later/.  Thrasher writes:
When President Ronald Reagan re-lit the Statue of Liberty torch in July 1986 and
then, later that year, signed the Simpson-Mazzoli Act (also known as the Immigration
Reform and Control Act), Mendez got lucky.  An illegal immigrant herself, she was
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paying into the system.15  This one-time amnesty provided by IRCA was
similar to winning a lottery ticket for Mendez and also brought benefits
to the U.S. economy by offsetting the costs of undocumented immi-
grants.16  It seemed like a win-win situation for the U.S. economy and the
three million individuals who received amnesty at that time.  So where is
Mendez twenty-five years after becoming a legal immigrant under
IRCA?  Recently, Mendez traveled to Miami, where her legal, U.S. resi-
dent son had been jailed for a traffic incident.17  Even after he paid his
bail, he was held in custody for two extra days while “the authorities
checked out his papers.”18  This highlights the importance of discussing
the impact that measures like the IRCA have on children that legally
enter the United States through their parents’ amnesty.  The IRCA may
have been a beneficial one-time amnesty solution for undocumented
aliens already in the United States, but it did not solve the issue of immi-
gration for future immigrants, such as Mendez’s son.19
These issues—both dealing with economic impact of illegal aliens al-
ready in the United States and creating remedies for future immigrants—
have not been properly addressed by the legislature in the past, and have
lead to the current debate about immigration reform.20  In June 2011, the
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) was introduced as a







19. See Thrasher, supra note 14 (discussing how even legal immigrants are still lost in
the process).  In detailing the situation of Mendez’s son, Thrasher writes:
[B]ecause he was an immigrant—even though his work permit was in order—he was
held in custody for two more days while authorities checked out his papers.  It didn’t
have to be this way: When she became a citizen through Reagan’s amnesty program,
she was allowed to sponsor her two Honduran sons for legal status, but one of them
chose not to become a full citizen.  Now that was causing him trouble—at a particu-
larly touchy and turbulent time for immigrants.
Id. However, the social impact is far beyond the scope of this Comment, and only probable
economic implications will be discussed.  What is certain is that current immigration laws
are not sufficient to keep up with the fast-developing U.S. economy. DONALD M. KERWIN,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., MORE THAN IRCA: U.S. LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS AND THE
CURRENT POLICY DEBATE 1 (2010), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/le-
galization-historical.pdf (explaining that the impact of future immigrants is uncertain).  For
a full discussion on the impact of citizenship on children, see Lee J. Tera´n, Mexican Chil-
dren of U.S. Citizens: “Viges Prin” and Other Tales of Challenges to Asserting Acquired
U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR ___ (2012).
20. See KERWIN, supra note 19, at 3.
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possible solution.21  CIRA’s main proposals include amnesty, increased
border security, and a new employment verification system.22  But is it
enough?  Past mistakes in the history of immigration reform must be ex-
amined and compared to CIRA to determine whether CIRA will truly
solve both current and future immigration problems.
II. THE ROAD THAT LEADS TO THE CURRENT NEED FOR
IMMIGRATION REFORM
How did we get here?  How did the United States end up with approxi-
mately eleven million undocumented immigrants in the midst of an eco-
nomic depression and an urgent need for immigration reform?23  In the
midst of these current immigration debates, it is important to remember
that immigrants founded the United States.24  Immigrants are this coun-
try’s roots, the bedrock, and heart and soul of what this country has rep-
resented since the Pilgrims first arrived.25  In 1620, the United States was
founded by people aspiring to live what we now call the “American
21. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011) (introduced in Senate Jun. 22, 2011); Press Release, Robert Menendez, Colleagues
Re-Introduce Comprehensive Immigration Reform (June 22, 2011) (available at http://me-
nendez.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=0c6c73f2-5366-4fde-bd9d-4e5d85c1b8f3)
[hereinafter Menendez Press Release].
22. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; Menendez Press Release, supra
note 21.
23. Julia Preston, 11.2 Million Illegal Immigrants in U.S. in 2010, Report Says; No
Change from ’09, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/us/02im-
mig.html.
24. See Immigration to the United States, U.S. IMMIGR. SUPPORT, http://www.usim-
migrationsupport.org/immigration-us.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (discussing immigra-
tion trends in the United States).
25. Id.; U.S. Immigration History, RAPID IMMIGR., http://www.rapidimmigration.com/
1_eng_immigration_history.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
Discoveries made by various anthropologists of human remains over the past few de-
cades provide evidence that long before Ellis Island opened its doors to welcome
those seeking political and religious freedom as well as the “adventurer, the wanderer,
the persecuted, the fortune seekers, and others” America was a kaleidoscope of ethnic
and cultural groups!  Thus, the history of [U.S.] immigration spans a long period of
migration of many different peoples from various parts of the world.  One common
belief is that America was originally peopled by wanderers from Northeast Asia about
20,000 years ago.  These wanderers were believed by some to be the founding popula-
tion (and ancestors!) of today’s Native Americans.  Others believe that the first Amer-
icans came from Polynesia, South Asia or even Europe.  Even others believe that the
very first Americans were killed by later arrivals and that they left no descendants.
The debate rages on!  However, not to be lost in this debate is the fact that whether
20,000, 10,000 or 1,000 years ago, most immigrant groups to America came full of
hopes and dreams of the “Promised Land.”
Id.
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Dream.”26  Today, people attempting to live the “American Dream” can
be charged with “aggravated felonies,” and thousands of immigrants are
currently being held in detention facilities.27  In fact, 380,000 immigrants
were detained in 2009 alone.28
The United States fell a long way from the 1800s, when immigrants laid
a foundation for the freedom we all enjoy today, to 2012, when immi-
grants are being treated as felons.  The following are key events in immi-
gration history leading to the current need for immigration reform:29
26. U.S. Immigration History, supra note 25; TODAY’S AM. DREAM, http://
todaysamericandream.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (defining “American Dream”). See
also Immigration to the United States, supra note 24 (outlining immigration history).
27. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; About the U.S. Detention and Deportation System, DETENTION
WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/aboutdetention (last visited
Dec. 18, 2011).
28. About the U.S. Detention and Deportation System, supra note 27 (including “survi-
vors of torture, asylum seekers and other vulnerable groups including pregnant women,
children, and individuals who are seriously ill without proper medication or care”).
29. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a) (1982)); The Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1965); The
Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1965); Naturalization Act of 1906,
ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 (repealed 1940); Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477; Naturaliza-
tion Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802); Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 19-20, 1
Stat. 414 (repealed 1802); Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
876 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:869
MAJOR IMMIGRATION REFORMS PASSED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS
Year Name of the Act Description
Prior to Naturalization Act of 1790, Established basic requirements for
1800 Naturalization Act of 1795, citizenship, including residency
Naturalization Act of 1798
1875 The Page Act of 1875 The first act that restricted immigration
1906 The Naturalization Act of 1906 Standardized naturalization procedures,
made some knowledge of English a
requirement for citizenship, and
established the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization
1921 The Emergency Quota Act Restricted annual immigration
1924 The Immigration Act of 1924 and The Established quota and divided
National Origins Formula immigrants into quota and non-quota
nations in response to rising immigration
from Europe and Asia
1952 The Immigration and Nationality Act of Established national guidelines and
1952 combined statutes
1965 The Immigration and Nationality Act of Mexican immigration became restricted
1965 for the first time and national quotas
were discontinued
1986 The Immigration Reform and Control Granted amnesty to qualifying illegal
Act of 1986 (IRCA) immigrants, increased funding for INS,
and imposed penalties on employers
1996 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Attempted to correct shortfalls of IRCA
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 of 1986
(IRIRA)
2011 Comprehensive Immigration and Proposed: amnesty, stricter penalties,
Reform Act of 2011 (CIRA) increased border security
From the early ages of American history until 1952, there were scat-
tered statutes regarding several aspects of immigration law.30  However,
1952 marked the first significant attempt by the federal government to
create a national immigration policy with the passage of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, which established immigration guidelines
nationwide.31
Because CIRA, the most recent piece of proposed legislation for immi-
gration reform has similar goals as IRCA, the two most important pieces
of past legislative reform that need to be examined are IRCA and a revi-
sion of IRCA, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
30. Landmarks in Immigration History, DIGITAL HISTORY, http://www.digitalhistory.
uh.edu/historyonline/immigration_chron.cfm (last updated Jan. 7, 2012).
31. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163);
Landmarks in Immigration History, supra note 30.
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bility Act (IIRIRA).32  It is important to examine these two major past
reforms in order to understand how the United States arrived at its cur-
rent need for immigration reform, and more importantly to determine
how to avoid prior immigration reform mistakes.
The first major federal immigration reform that granted amnesty was
IRCA, which was passed in 1986 and increased funding for United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) while imposing penalties
on employers.33  The second major piece of immigration legislation was
IIRIRA, which was passed in 1996 in an attempt to correct the shortfalls
of IRCA.34  The current attempt at immigration reform is the CIRA,
which was introduced in 2011 and seems to be a revised version of
IRCA.35  The common factor between each of these major reforms is ec-
onomic recession.36  As history shows, immigration reform is closely re-
lated to the economic state of the country, or more specifically, a slump in
the economy leads to a call for immigration reform.37
In order to determine what led to IRCA, it is important to examine the
economic state of the country prior to 1986.  From the 1950s to the early
1980s, the United States experienced the lowest immigration levels in the
past 100 years.38  For example, 1970 was the lowest point of immigration,
with immigrants making up only 4.7 percent of the population of the
32. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, § 702; Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; see, KERWIN, supra note 19 (discussing the ef-
fects of IRCA).
33. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; see NANCY RYTINA, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION SERV.–OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, IRCA LEGALIZA-
TION EFFECTS: LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENCE AND NATURALIZATION THROUGH 2001,
at 2 (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/irca
0114int.pdf (discussing the purpose and guidelines of IRCA, and explaining that the high-
est rate of IRCA naturalizations occurred in 1996 when one quarter million immigrants
became citizens).
34. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986.
35. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011. See SEN. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
ET AL., THE COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT OF 2011, SHORT SUMMARY OF
MENENDEZ CIRA BILL 1, available at http://www.micevhill.com/attachments/immigration_
documents/hosted_documents/112th_congress/ShortSummaryOfMenendezCIRBill.pdf
[hereinafter SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL] (summarizing CIRA and out-
lining CIRA’s major goals).
36. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LA-
BOR–BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea01.htm (last
modified Jan. 6, 2012) (showing high rates of unemployment in the early 1980s and late
2000s, the same time frame as IRCA and CIRA).
37. Id.
38. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, BACKGROUNDER: IM-
MIGRANTS IN THE U.S., 2007 A PROFILE OF AMERICA’S FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 4
(Nov. 2007), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back1007.pdf.
878 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:869
United States.39  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the U.S. economy
entered a recession, the immigrant population jumped to 6.2 percent40
with Mexican immigrants accounting for the majority of the increase.41
In fact, legal Mexican immigrants accounted for forty-two percent of all
new immigrants arriving between 1980 and 1984, and undocumented
Mexican immigrants were estimated to cross the border at a rate of ap-
proximately 40,000 per year.42  Between the 1980s and the early 1990s,
this number doubled.43  During this period of rapidly increasing immi-
grant population, the U.S. economy was declining.  By 1982, the unem-
ployment rate was at 9.7 percent44—similar to today’s unemployment
rate.45  The high unemployment rate combined with the struggling econ-
omy created frustration that led to the passage of IRCA in 1986.46  How-
ever, it is still hard to believe that the downfall of the economy and a
skyrocketing unemployment rate was a result of the forty to eighty thou-
sand undocumented Mexican immigrants that entered the United States
at this time.47  However, over twenty years later, current illegal immigra-
tion rates and unemployment rates appear to be connected.48
A. How the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Attempted
to Correct Undocumented Immigration
IRCA was the legislature’s first major attempt to address the growing




42. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS
AND CHARACTERISTICS 16 (June 2005), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/re-
ports/46.pdf.
43. Id. at 6.
44. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTI-
TUTIONAL POPULATION, 1940 TO DATE (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cp-
saat1.pdf [hereinafter BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS].
45. In January 2012, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, as reported by the
Department of Labor was 8.3 percent. Employment Situation Summary, BUREAU OF LA-
BOR STATISTICS (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.  The an-
nual rate for 2011 was 9.6 percent. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 44.
46. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359;
see also Richard E. Blum, Labor Standards Enforcement and the Results of Labor Migra-
tion: Protecting Undocumented Workers After Sure-Tan, the IRCA, and Patel, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1342, 1360-68 (1988) (discussing the history behind what led up to the IRCA).
47. PASSEL, supra note 42.
48. See An Amnesty for the UK’s Illegal Immigrants, THE WEEK WITH THE FIRST
POST, http://www.theweek.co.uk/24011/amnesty-uk’s-illegal-immigrants (last updated Apr.
15, 2009) (explaining that the same view is also common in other countries, such as the
United Kingdom).
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of an economic recession.49  It contained three major elements: (1) am-
nesty of undocumented aliens already in U.S. territory, (2) stricter penal-
ties for employers hiring these aliens, and (3) provided funding for border
protection to prevent aliens from entering U.S. territory.50  Although
IRCA seemed to be great in theory, it failed in practice.51  While attempt-
ing to correct a present immigration problem, IRCA failed to foresee,
and properly address, future immigration issues.52  The main elements of
IRCA are also reflected in the currently proposed CIRA, which is why it
is important to examine IRCA to avoid past mistakes.53
The first major element of IRCA was providing amnesty to undocu-
mented aliens already in the United States by granting temporary legal
resident status through the general legalization program, or permanent
residency to qualifying agricultural workers.54  Almost three million peo-
ple were granted amnesty and became legal U. S. residents.55  The second
element of IRCA addressed employers hiring undocumented workers
through enforcement of stricter penalties on the employers who did so.56
IRCA made the following punishable by law: (1) to knowingly hire some-
one who did not have the proper authorization and documentation to
work in the United States, (2) continue to employ an unauthorized
worker, and (3) it made the employer responsible for verifying a person’s
identity and eligibility to work in the United States.57  The actual enforce-
ment of this last element was one of the failures of the implementation of
IRCA.58
49. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; BETSY COOPER & KEVIN O’NEIL,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., LESSONS FROM THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT
OF 1986, at 1 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/PolicyBrief_
No3_Aug05.pdf.
50. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49.
51. COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49, at 4–8.
52. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49,
at 4.
53. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49, at
4.
54. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49,
at 4.
55. COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49, at 3.
56. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, sec. 101, § 274A, 100 Stat. at 3360
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a); COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49, at 2–3.
57. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, sec. 101, § 274A, COOPER &
O’NEIL, supra note 49, at 2–3.
58. COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49.
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The third major element of IRCA was to increase funding for border
patrol, especially along the Mexican border.59  This element also failed in
practice and implementation.60  Although the lawmaker’s ideas in IRCA
seemed realistic, the government agency in charge of implementing those
processes, the INS, was not able to implement them properly.61  IRCA is
often deemed a failure; however, it is important to recognize why IRCA
did not yield the result that lawmakers expected.62
B. Fixing IRCA: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996
The lawmakers attempted to correct the downfalls of IRCA with the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA).63  IIRIRA imposed stricter penalties on immigrants remaining
in the United States after expiration of their authorized period.64
IIRIRA also restricted such immigrants from re-entering the United
States for several years after deportation.65  IIRIRA’s stricter penalties
were designed to discourage unauthorized immigration; however, actually
detaining immigrants who overstayed their visa periods was another
failed process.66  Some deportees were held in U.S. prisons for years
awaiting their hearing.67  Not only was this an inefficient and inhumane
process, it was also costly to the states.68  Again, while lawmakers at-
tempted to regulate immigration because it was perceived to be harmful
59. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, § 111; COOPER & O’NEIL, supra
note 49, at 3.
60. COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49, at 3
61. Id. at 5.
62. See id. at 7–8 (discussing the current relevance of IRCA).
63. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered section of the U.S.C.); IIRIRA
96 - A Summary of the New Immigration Bill, VISALAW.COM, http://www.visalaw.com/
96nov/3nov96.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
64. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, tit. 3, sec.
301, § 212a1.
65. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, sec. 324,
§ 276(a)(1)); IIRIRA 96 - A Summary of the New Immigration Bill, supra note 63.
66. See Bernstein, supra note 1 (illustrating an example of the disastrous effects when
city tried to detain deportee).
67. See id. (illustrating multiple deportee’s incarceration experiences, and explaining
that once detained, the deportees were often transferred to another facility before their
families had a chance to visit them).
68. Id.; see How Much Does it Cost to Feds Estimate Deportation Costs $12,500 per
person, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/na-
tionworld/2014046941_apusimmigrationcosts.html?syndication=rss [hereinafter Feds Esti-
mate] (estimating the United States spent five billion dollars to deport 400,000
immigrants).
2012] ECONOMIC EFFECTS 881
to the U.S. economy, the actual implementation of these newly passed
regulations ended up backfiring and becoming more costly for the United
States.69
After the failure of IRCA and IIRIRA, Congress is once again propos-
ing major immigration reform through CIRA.70  Is CIRA the answer to
today’s need for immigration reform, or is there a better answer?  This
Comment will examine the economic impact of IRCA, the proposed
changes of CIRA, and how other countries have dealt with immigration
issues.  Since the economic impact of undocumented aliens seems to be
the center of immigration debate, this Comment focuses on the costs and
benefits of immigration in the midst of an economic recession.
C. The Current Immigration System in the United States
There are currently four ways to become a naturalized U.S. citizen: (1)
permanent U.S. residency for five years,71 (2) permanent U.S. residency
for three years and a spouse who is a U.S. citizen,72 (3) serving in the U.S.
Armed Forces,73 or (4) being a child of a U.S. citizen.74  The majority of
immigrants become a naturalized U.S. citizen through permanent resi-
dence by obtaining a “Green Card.”75  A Green Card can be obtained
through family, employment, asylee or refugee status, and other special
programs that apply to a very small class of immigrants.76  In order to
obtain a Green Card, you must first acquire a visa in order to enter the
United States.77  In 2010, there were 482,052 immigrant visas issued.78
69. Bernstein, supra note 1; Feds Estimate, supra note 68.
70. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006).
72. Id. § 1430(a).
73. Id. § 1439(a).
74. Id. § 1401; Tera´n, supra note 19.
75. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.– CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, A
GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION 46 (2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/M-
476.pdf; USCIS Green Card, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES,  http://www.
uscis.gov/greencard (last updated May 13, 2011).
76. USCIS Green Card, supra note 75; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, supra
note 75.
77. Green Card Procedure and Processes, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (click on “Green Card Processes & Procedures”) (last up-
dated Sept. 9, 2009); see Visa Types for Immigrants, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE–BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFF., http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1326.html (last visited
Jan. 7, 2012) (explaining that an immigrant must obtain at least one type of visa before they
can get a Green Card).
78. Multi-Year Graphs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE–BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., http://
travel.state.gov/visa/statistics/graphs/graphs_4399.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
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The current waiting list for family-based visas alone is 4,552,774,79 while
the number of visas issued per year for family category is only 226,000.80
At this rate, it will take fifteen years to process the current waiting list.
While some children may qualify for a family visa through their parents
before they reach the age of twenty-one, many of them will have reached,
or exceeded twenty-one by the time they make it through the waiting list,
and will no longer qualify for a family-based visa.  As of October 2011,
the cutoff date for a majority of sibling-sponsored immigration visas was
May 15, 2000.81  This means that brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens who
applied prior to that date are just now up for eligibility review.82  While
waiting “in line” for those eleven years, the likelihood that the sibling’s
children turned twenty-one years of age and therefore no longer qualify is
pretty high.  For citizens of the Philippines, the sibling-sponsored visa
waitlist is currently processing applications from 1988.83  It is hard to im-
agine what it must feel like to wait twenty-three years just to be able to
live in the same country as your brother or sister.  Additionally, the per-
manent resident application fee is currently $1,020; many application fees
are increasing, and some are as high as $6,230.84  This is unmistakably a
broken system that separates families for decades.  Keeping these stark
79. Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-sponsored and Em-
ployment-based preferences Registered at the National Visa Center as of November 1, 2011,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE-BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/Waitin-
gListItem.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
80. Visa Availability and Priority Dates, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.– CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e
5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=aa290a5659083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD
&vgnextchannel=AA290a5659083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated June
15, 2011) [hereinafter Visa Availability and Priority Dates] (excluding immediate family,
such as parents and children, for which there is no limit; however, processing still takes a
substantial amount of time).
81. Visa Bulletin for October 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE–BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFF., http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5560.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
82. Id.
This bulletin summarizes the availability of immigrant numbers during OCTOBER.
Consular officers are required to report to the Department of State documentarily
qualified applicants for numerically limited visas; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services in the Department of Homeland Security reports applicants for adjustment of
status.  Allocations were made, to the extent possible, in chronological order of re-
ported priority dates, for demand received by September 9TH.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Check Filing Fees, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.– CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f
6d1a/?vgnextoid=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b1
ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated Mar. 18, 2011) (outlining
the range of fees per category).
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numbers in mind, it is not surprising that there are somewhere between
eleven and twelve million undocumented immigrants currently in the
United States.85  This immigrant population, estimated at 3.7 percent of
the U.S. population, has a noticeable and significant impact on the U.S.
economy—both in positive and negative respects.86
III. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
And while immigrants surely have contributed to some extent to the
ranks of the poor, that was also true of previous waves of immi-
grants; the point is, most of these immigrants didn’t stay poor.87
Such transitions do not happen overnight without action or change.
The widespread opinion among the American public is that undocu-
mented aliens take advantage of government services and have a negative
effect to the U.S. economy.88  This general misconception is simply and
“undeniably false.”89  A survey obtained in 2006 illustrated that eighty-
five percent of economists believed that the U.S. economy has benefited
from its alien population more than it had been harmed.90  Even in 1995,
seventy-four percent of economists believed that undocumented aliens
positively influenced the U.S. economy.91  The alien population grew
from about five million in 1996 to 11.3 million in 2006.92  Even though the
population more than doubled, more economists believe that the benefits
that come from immigration outweigh the costs.93
85. JEFFERY PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMI-
GRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1 (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.  Researchers state that as of March 2010
the number of unauthorized immigrants was around 11.2 million, but over the past five
years the number has fluctuated between eleven and twelve million. Id. For the sake of
consistency in this Comment I will use eleven million, or between eleven and twelve
million.
86. Id.
87. Editorial, Immigrants Equal Growth . . . Reform Isn’t Just Human.  It’s Self-Inter-
est, WASH. POST, June 4, 2007, at A14.
88. Francine J.Lipman, Taxing Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal and
Without Representation, 59 TAX LAW 813, 813 (2006).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 824.
91. Id.
92. ILLEGAL RESIDENT ALIEN POPULATION 1 (n.d), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/illegal.pdf (placing the number of undocumented aliens living in
the United States between 4.5 and 5.6 million); PASSEL & COHN, supra note 85 (tracking
the undocumented alien population from 2000 to 2010).
93. Comprehensive Immigration Reform in 2009, Can We Do It and How?, S. Judici-
ary Comm., Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship, 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former Chair. Fed. Reserve), available at http://
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What are the costs and benefits associated with the immigration of un-
documented aliens?  It is hard to calculate the exact numbers since these
are undocumented residents; however, most economists agree on general
estimates.  On the national level, the yearly cost of immigration is esti-
mated at $113 billion,94 while the benefits of consumption by these indi-
viduals is estimated to be $400–450 billion.95  The main costs of
immigration include healthcare, education, and criminal justice system
expenses.96  While the main benefits of include consumption of goods and
services, affordable labor for small businesses, and contribution in
taxes—while not receiving the benefits of federal welfare.97
A. The Major Costs of Immigration
As stated above, a major cost of unauthorized immigration is health-
care.98  The costs are especially high in border states such as Texas, Ari-
zona, and California, where several hospitals have been closed or are on
the brink of bankruptcy because of the federal requirement to supply
emergency room care to all uninsured individuals—including undocu-
mented immigrants.99  The estimated cost of providing healthcare to all
uninsured individuals may reach $2.2 billion.100  The key word here is
“uninsured.”  Healthcare insurance is often times provided as one of the
benefits through an employer, which is clearly an unattainable option for
www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da147e5ee
&wit_id=ce655f9e2809e5476862f735da147e5ee-1-2 [hereinafter Greenspan].
94. JACK MARTIN & ERIC A. RUARK, FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
REFORM 1 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/USCostStudy_
2010.pdf?docID=4921.  The report estimates that the “annual costs of illegal immigration
at the federal, state and local level to be about $113 billion; nearly $29 billion at the federal
level and $84 billion at the state and local level.” Id.
95. Patricia O’Connell, A Massive Economic Development Boom, BUSINESSWEEK,
July 18, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_29/b3943005_mz001.htm
(interview with UCLA professor Raul Hinojosa discussing the capacity for consumption of
undocumented immigrants in the United States).
96. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CNTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE HIGH COST OF
CHEAP LABOR: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 5, 25 (2004), available
at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/fiscal.pdf [hereinafter CAMAROTA, THE HIGH COST OF
CHEAP LABOR].
97. Lipman, supra note 88.
98. E.g., CAMAROTA, THE HIGH COST OF CHEAP LABOR, supra note 96; MARTIN &
RUARK, supra note 94, at 1, 15, 55; Statement by Lindsay B. Lowell, Dir. of Policy Studies,
Inst. for the Study of Int’l Migration, Georgetown Univ., August 25, 2004, The Cost of
Illegal Immigration: The Impact of Illegal Aliens on the Federal Budget, http://www.cis.org/
articles/2004/fiscaltranscript.html.
99. MARTIN & RUARK, supra note 94, at 55; The Economic Costs of Legal and Illegal
Immigration, COLO. ALLIANCE FOR IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.cairco.org/econ/
econ.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
100. CAMAROTA, THE HIGH COST OF CHEAP LABOR, supra note 96.
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undocumented workers.  The fact that these individuals are undocu-
mented keeps them from obtaining legal employment and its benefits,
leaving them uninsured and resulting in a devastating impact on the U.S.
healthcare system.101  There are no statistics to compare the cost of pro-
viding healthcare to documented immigrants because they have access to
legal employment benefits, such as health insurance.  However, when
putting a documented and an undocumented immigrant side by side, the
only major difference is “a piece of paper”—a Green Card.  This piece of
paper seems to be the key to reducing healthcare costs.102
Another major cost of unauthorized immigration is education, esti-
mated at $52 billion per year.103  Taxpayer contribution is the main
source of education funding,104 as taxes for education are generally in-
cluded in the yearly property tax bill, which every homeowner is obli-
gated to pay.105  Since home ownership is another unattainable option for
undocumented immigrants, they are unable to significantly contribute to
national education costs.  In an indirect way, they contribute by paying
rent to a landowner, who in turn pays the property taxes; however, it
would be impossible to calculate the actual amount contributed in this
manner.  Again, the “piece of paper” that separates an documented and
an undocumented immigrant has a huge impact on the cost of education
because without it, immigrants are unable to contribute to education
costs.
101. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY FACTS ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED
(Aug. 2003), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/Immigrants-Health-Care-
Coverage-and-Access-fact-sheet.pdf (explaining access to healthcare coverage for legal
and illegal immigrants, where it was estimated that thirteen percent of unauthorized immi-
grants have access to Medicaid).
102. See MARTIN & RUARK, supra note 94, at 15–18 (explaining that paying for the
treatment of uninsured individuals is extremely high, and illegal immigrants who do not
have any means to legally pay into the system are included in the category of uninsured).
103. Id. at 1 (stating that this cost is almost completely absorbed by state and local
governments).
104. MARGARET SPELLINGS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND–10
FACTS ABOUT K-12 EDUCATION FUNDING 1 (June 2005), available at http://www2.ed.gov/
about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html.  The report states that:
Even in this current time of the war against terror, taxpayer investment in education
exceeds that for national defense.  In addition to the K-12 money mentioned above,
taxpayers will spend an estimated $373 billion for higher education in the same school
year . . . the United States is a world leader in education investment.  However, na-
tions that spend far less achieve higher levels of student performance.
Id.
105. See Susan Combs, Appraisal, WINDOW ON STATE GOV’T, http://www.win-
dow.state.tx.us/taxinfo/proptax/basics/ch02.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (illustrating an
example of a property tax bill and showing how taxes are allocated towards education).
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The third, and perhaps most misunderstood and debated cost of unau-
thorized immigration, is the cost to the U.S. criminal justice system—esti-
mated at $500 million dollars per year.106  Undocumented aliens
comprise an estimated seventeen percent of the federal prison popula-
tion.107  However, such statistics fail to disclose that the majority of aliens
detained are not charged with a crime, but are simply being detained be-
cause of their status.108  Such skewed statistics give the American public a
general misconception that a high number of undocumented immigrants
are criminals.
The majority of highly debated economic costs of illegal immigration
can be eliminated with yet another “piece of paper”—amnesty.  Granting
amnesty to unregistered aliens would give them the same opportunities as
legal immigrants, which would enable them to contribute to costs such as
healthcare and education.  As previously mentioned, the immigrant pop-
ulation brings extraordinary benefits to the U.S. economy.109
B. The Economic Benefits of Immigration
The first major benefit to the U.S. economy stemming from undocu-
mented immigrants is the consumption of goods and services.110  There
are currently an estimated eleven million unregistered immigrants in the
United States—all of whom are inevitably consumers.111  In today’s eco-
nomic crisis, consumer confidence and spending are the keys to economic
recovery.112  Eliminating the alien population would eliminate over
eleven million consumers at a time when every consumer is desperately
needed.113  In fact, consumption of goods and services by undocumented
immigrants who spend their paychecks in the United States and also in-
106. COLORADO ALLIANCE FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 99 (“Taxpayers
pay half-a-billion dollars per year incarcerating illegal alien criminals.”).
107. CAMAROTA, THE HIGH COST OF CHEAP LABOR, supra note 96, at 20.
108. See Bernstein, supra note 1 (relating the situation at the Donald W. Wyatt De-
tention Facility where the facility held individuals not charged with any crime, but waiting
for deportation).
109. Lipman, supra note 88, at 816–17 (discussing the positive impact to the U.S.
economy through consumption, provision of essential work services, and other contribu-
tions to the economy).
110. Id. at 816.
111. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 85.
112. See Kimberly Amadeo, What is GDP? ABOUT.COM: U.S. ECON., http://
useconomy.about.com/od/grossdomesticproduct/p/GDP.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2011)
(defining Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and explaining that it is the best measure to
analyze the strength of the U.S. economy).
113. See Lipman, supra note 88, at 816–17 (explaining the large contribution immi-
grants make to the economy through the consumption of goods and services).
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crease production for their employers is estimated at $800 billion.114
Some argue that those indivduals are not contributing to the U.S. econ-
omy because they send their paychecks to their families in their native
countries instead of spending it in the United States.115  But even after
remittance, immigrants are estimated to have consumptive capacity of
$400–450 billion per year.116  Because of this, eliminating the alien popu-
lation today would also eliminate this consumption and cause “the worst
economic disaster in the history of the [United States].”117
The labor force created by undocumented immigrants is extremely
helpful to small businesses and benefits the U.S. economy.118  Employing
these immigrants keeps labor costs down for small businesses, which
keeps the cost of goods down and benefits all Americans.119  Undocu-
mented immigrants fill millions of worker positions that are essential to
the U.S. economy, which results in further job creation.120  In fact, un-
documented workers accounted for a sixteen percent increase in the U.S.
labor force between 2000 and 2007 and composed five percent of the la-
bor force in 2008.121  It is important to note that despite this significant
contribution, these illegal immigrants do not have access to any type of
federal welfare benefits.122  Furthermore, they are considered to be a
flexible element of the U.S. labor force and are the first to be laid off
during an economic crisis.123  Although some studies suggest that em-
ploying undocumented workers decreases the wages of Americans who
do not have a high-school education, such wage suppression does not
have a significant impact on the U.S. economy and any affect it may have
is outweighed by the economic benefits of an undocumented
workforce.124
114. O’Connell, supra note 95.
115. COLORADO ALLIANCE FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 99 (discussing the
fact that undocumented immigrants tend to send a large amount of their income to rela-
tives living in their native land).  The economic term for this behavior is remittance. Id.
116. O’Connell, supra note 95.
117. Id.
118. Greenspan, supra note 93.
119. Id.
120. Lipman, supra note 88, at 816–17.
121. Greenspan, supra note 93.
122. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (even after Congress passed IRCA in 1986 and IIRIRA in
1996, which left business owners feeling that the benefits and need to hire illegal immi-
grants outweighed the possible punishment); Editorial, supra note 87.  For a more detailed
discussion of the impact of immigration on employment see Nicole E. Merritt, Comment,
The Conflicting Interests of Labor Demands and Employer Based Immigration Laws: Old
Problems Require New Solutions, 11 SCHOLAR 281 (2009).
123. Greenspan, supra note 93.
124. Id.
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Additionally, immigrants benefit the economy by contributing to tax
revenues.125  For example, the Texas Comptroller’s office reported costs
to the government of $1.16 billion for services in education and health-
care to undocumented immigrants and their children, but also reported a
tax revenue of $1.58 billion from the same.126  These figures show that
Texas actually profited $427.7 million from its population of undocu-
mented immigrants in 2006.127  Simply stated, immigrants that obtain
false documentation for employment still contribute taxes through pay-
roll.128  Those same immigrants that contribute taxes through payroll will
never actually have a chance to collect the benefits, such as Medicare.129
Furthermore, all undocumented immigrants inevitably pay the sales tax
when they purchase goods.130  Again, this means that there are over
eleven million consumers that contribute to the economy each time they
spend money by paying sales tax.131  Because of this, it is important to
carefully consider all of the economic costs and benefits of unauthorized
immigration when drafting U.S. immigration reform.  Today’s economic
crisis emphasizes the need for immigration reform to eliminate the costs,
keep the benefits, and help revive the economy.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The idea of deporting these [eleven] or [twelve] million people[—
]about as many as live in the entire state of Pennsylvania[—]is pure
fantasy . . . . [E]conomic consequences would be devastating.132
The above quote represent exactly what the current U.S. immigration
system is in the process of doing by hunting down undocumented aliens,
most of whom are not criminals, confining them in detention centers and
letting the taxpayers pay for the cost.133  Obviously, the current system of
deporting all the undocumented  immigrants that are currently in the
United States is not realistic or economically feasible.134  Another way
Congress has attempted to get rid of the undocumented immigrant popu-
125. Editorial, supra note 87.
126. Despite Rhetoric, Illegal Immigration Provides Benefits to States, FOXBUSINESS,
available at http://m.foxbusiness.com/quickPage.html?page=19453&content=38441598&
pageNum=-1 (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Despite Rhetoric].
127. Id.
128. Editorial, supra note 87.
129. Despite Rhetoric, supra note 126.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Bloomberg, supra note 8
133. See Bernstein, supra note 1 (detailing the story of Mr. Cante´, mentioned above in
the Introduction).
134. Bloomberg, supra note 8.
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lation in the United States is by providing incentives for voluntary leave
and imposing stricter punishments for those who stay.135  This attempt
has been unsuccessful, as the undocumented immigrant population has
significantly increased since the passage of the regulations in 1996—
rather than decreasing as Congress had hoped.136
The bottom line is the United States has more than eleven million un-
documented immigrants present today, past attempts to get these immi-
grants to leave the United States created an adverse effect, and current
attempts can best be described as mere “fantasy.”137  And despite all of
the efforts to expel these immigrants from the United States, the majority
of economists believe undocumented immigrants are more of a benefit to
our economy than a problem.138  So why is the U.S. government trying so
hard to achieve what would ultimately result in an economic disaster?
After weighing the costs and benefits of immigration on the U.S. econ-
omy, it seems that allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the
United States by granting amnesty, would be the most economically ben-
eficial option.139  Not only is it the most economically beneficial option,
but it seems to be the only economically realistic option based on prior
immigration reform attempts.  However, granting amnesty will not be suf-
ficient to prevent future immigration issues and steps must be made to-
ward a long term solution.
A. Why Amnesty is the Only Answer
There are two options regarding undocumented immigrants in the
United States today: (1) keep them in U.S. territory or (2) get them out of
the United States.  The first option, granting amnesty to deserving immi-
grants and letting them pay into the system similar to legal immigrants,
would offset most of the costs of unauthorized immigration described
above.  The second option, deporting all undocumented immigrants—all
eleven to twelve million—is what the current immigration system is at-
tempting to do at the cost of $12,500 per immigrant.140  Putting aside all
the social and moral arguments of forgiving an “illegal” by granting am-
135. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, §§ 304, 334, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587, 3009-635.
136. RYTINA, supra note 33, at 3.
137. Bloomberg, supra note 8.
138. Id.
139. See Is Illegal Immigration an Economic Burden to America?, PROCON.ORG, http:/
/immigration.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000788 (last updated Oct. 20,
2011) (quoting various sources stating that despite clear evidence that immigrants put a
substantial drain on the economy, the overall effect, after considering taxes paid and jobs
created, is one that results in a benefit to the U.S. economy).
140. Feds Estimate, supra note 68
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nesty, it is important to examine each option and compare them in eco-
nomic terms.
1. Option I: Deportation-Current Enforcement and Costs
Deportation is currently handled by Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE).141  Since 1996 the yearly deportation rate has increased
by 400 percent.142  In fact, since Obama took office in 2009, over one
million people have been deported.143  At this rate of deportation, rough
estimates and simple math reveal that it will take over twenty years and
cost around $140 billion to deport all the undocumented aliens that reside
in the United States.144  Furthermore, deportations will also eliminate ec-
onomic benefits of immigration, by removing over eleven million con-
sumers from the United States.145  Disregarding the argument that it is
inhumane to break apart millions of families, it would have a devastating
effect on the U.S. economy.146
Furthermore, the fact that more undocumented aliens are being de-
ported does not mean that the United States is becoming a safer place.  In
fact, the increase in ICE deportation quotas has had an adverse effect.147
141. ICE Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
about/overview/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).  The website states that:
[The] Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the principal investigative arm of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the second largest investigative
agency in the federal government.  Created in 2003 through a merger of the investiga-
tive and interior enforcement elements of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, ICE now has more than 20,000 employees in offices in
all [fifty] states and [forty-seven] foreign countries.
Id.
142. AARTI KOHLI, ET AL., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW
AND SOC. POLICY 1 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_
Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Feds Estimate, supra note 68.
145. See Lipman, supra note 88, at 816–17 (explaining that the economic benefits out-
weigh the costs of illegal immigration).
146. See RAU´L HINOJOSA-OJEDA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RAISING THE FLOOR FOR
AMERICAN WORKERS: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION RE-
FORM, 1 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/pdf/im-
migrationeconreport.pdf (stating that removal of the undocumented immigrant population
would be detrimental to the U.S. economy).
147. Spencer S. Hsu & Andrew Becker, ICE Officials Set Quota to Deport More Ille-
gal Immigrants, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/03/26/AR2010032604891.html.  “Under the Bush administration, ICE
officials in 2006 increased an annual quota from 125 to 1,000 arrests for each fugitive oper-
ations team.  At the same time, the agency dropped its policy that agents focus on criminals
and deportation violators.” Id.
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ICE currently has a goal of 400,000 deportations per year, and came close
to achieving that goal in 2009 with 387,000 deportations.148  One of the
ways ICE plans on achieving the goal is “with a ‘surge’ in efforts to catch
undocumented immigrants whose only violation was lying on immigra-
tion or visa applications or reentering the United States after being de-
ported.”149  According to an ICE agent in the San Francisco area, such a
push to meet quotas causes ICE agents to detain undocumented immi-
grants with noncriminal charges, rather than detaining undocumented im-
migrants with criminal convictions because it takes longer to process
more dangerous criminal aliens.150  The less time it takes to process a
detained undocumented alien, the more undocumented aliens can be de-
tained, which is ICE’s major goal.151  This leads one to question how this
procedure of establishing quotas corresponds to ICE’s mission to “pro-
mote homeland security and public safety?”152
2. Option II:  Amnesty
Amnesty is not the most desired option of many politicians, including
past presidents; however, even amnesty opponents realize that it is the
only realistic answer to dealing with the current undocumented immi-





152. ICE Overview, supra note 141.
153. Press Release, President Bush Discusses Comprehensive Immigration Reform in
Texas (Aug.3, 2006), (available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re-
leases/2006/08/20060803-8.html).  The press release states that:
I do not think we ought to grant amnesty to people who are here illegally.  And the
reason I don’t is I think that will encourage a whole other bunch of people to come.
But I know you cannot deport [ten] million people who have been here working.  It’s
unrealistic.  It may sound good in certain circles and political circles.  It’s not going to
work.  The best plan is to say to somebody who has been here illegally, if you’ve been
paying your taxes, and you’ve got a good criminal record, that you can pay a fine for
being here illegally, and you can learn English, like the rest of us have done, and you
can get in a citizenship line to apply for citizenship.  You don’t get to get in the front,
you get to get in the back of the line.  But this idea of deporting people is just not—it
doesn’t make any sense to me, and it doesn’t make any sense to a lot of people who
understand this issue.  So here’s a reasonable way to treat people with respect and
accomplish what we want to accomplish, which is to be a country of law and a country
of decency and respect . . . .
Id.
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a. Past Amnesty Reform
The first and only mass amnesty program in the history of United
States was the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).154
In 1986, the undocumented immigrant population was estimated to be
around three million.155  IRCA granted amnesty to approximately 2.7
million of these indivduals.156  That is, nine out of ten applicants met the
strict requirement of IRCA and were approved for permanent resi-
dency.157  About one-third of those applicants became naturalized U.S.
citizens by 2001, with the highest number of approvals occurring in 1996
when 250,000 immigrants were naturalized.158
IRCA created four paths to legalization: general amnesty in Section
245(A), the Seasonal Agricultural Worker (SAW) program for seasonal
agricultural workers, and two very narrow paths that cause very little con-
troversy and only applied to a select group of aliens.159  The first path of
general amnesty under Section 245(A) produced the most applicants with
a total of 1,763,434.160  To qualify, applicants had to meet the following
requirements: (1) they had to have lived in the United States continu-
ously since January 1, 1982, (2) they could not have a criminal record with
serious offenses, and (3) they were required to meet other general stipu-
lations.161  The second path to legalization, the SAW program, produced
1,277,041 applications.162  SAW gave amnesty to seasonal agricultural
workers who performed farm work for at least ninety days between 1984
and 1986.163
Some sources show that after ten years from obtaining amnesty, the
average person only had a seventh grade education and an income of less
than $9,000 per year.164  Opponents to amnesty suggest that because of
this, these legalized aliens cause a financial strain on American taxpay-
154. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359;
RYTINA, supra note 33, at 2.




159. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; DAVID NORTH, CTR. FOR IMMI-
GRATION STUDIES, BACKGROUNDER: A BAILOUT FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS? LESSONS
FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1986 IRCA AMNESTY 2 (Jan. 2007), available at http://
www.cis.org/articles/2010/irca-amnesty.pdf.
160. NORTH, supra note 159; RYTINA, supra note 33, at 3.
161. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; NORTH, supra note 159.
162. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; NORTH, supra note 159
163. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; NORTH, supra note 159.
164. Amnesty for Illegal Aliens, THE AM. RESISTANCE, http://www.theamericanresis-
tance.com/issues/amnesty.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
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ers.165  However, these statements are contradictory because these immi-
grants had to wait five years before they were provided with access to any
federal benefits.166  And during this time, many were still paying into the
system, which they could not access.167  It does not seem likely that pay-
ing into the system while not being able to take anything out of it would
create a financial burden.  In reality, it would seem to have the opposite
effect.  Other studies show that five years after legalization, most IRCA
legalized immigrants had better jobs than prior to legalization.168  Fur-
thermore, apprehensions of undocumented immigrants declined after
IRCA, which eliminated some of the costs shouldered by the U.S. gov-
ernment and taxpayers.169
IRCA had both positive and negative effects on the U.S. economy.170
On the plus side, IRCA allowed the United States to keep 2.7 million
consumers—letting them pay into the system and offset costs such as
healthcare and education—and reduced the number of deportations
which also reduced criminal justice costs.171  However, there were also
negative effects that included an influx of unauthorized immigrants hop-
ing to receive amnesty, and a backlog of visas because relatives of newly
legalized immigrants now qualified for legal entry into the United States.
165. Id.  “The toleration of illegal immigration undermines all of our labor . . .  It’s a
race to the bottom.  The one who plays by the rules is penalized . . . a guest worker pro-
gram guarantees wages will never go up, and there is no way American citizens can com-
pete with guest workers.” Id. (quoting Cornell Univ. Professor Vernon Briggs).
166. POMS Section: SI 00501.440 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, SOC.
SECURITY ONLINE (Aug, 26, 1999), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0500501440 (ex-
plaining that for Social Security benefits, “during the [five]-year period beginning on the
date LTR status is granted, LTR’s are ineligible for any Federal program of financial assis-
tance”).  LTR is defined as “[t]he status that may be granted [to] an illegal alien who has
applied for adjustment of status on May 5, 1987 or later, a special agricultural worker who
has applied for adjustment of status June 1, 1987 or later, or certain aliens on extended
voluntary departure status who applied for adjustment of status in the [twenty-four]-month
period beginning December 22, 1987.” Id.
167. Editorial, supra note 87.
168. Mary G. Powers et al., IRCA: Lessons of the Last US Legalization Program, CTR.
FOR HUM. RTS. AND CONST. LAW–THE LEGALIZATION SITE (Jul. 1, 2004), http://
www.nationalimmigrationreform.org/research/IRCA_study.
169. Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocu-
mented Immigration?: Evidence from IRCA, 40–3 DEMOGRAPHY 437, 444 (2003), available
at http://ecademy.agnesscott.edu/~mzavodny/documents/Demography_amnesty.pdf.
170. HINOJOSA-OJEDA, supra note 146.
171. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359;
see Is Illegal Immigration an Economic Burden to America?, supra note 139 (describing the
benefits of allowing illegal immigrants to stay in the United States and contribute to the
economy).
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b. Current Amnesty Proposals
The current immigration reform bill proposing amnesty is the Compre-
hensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011 (CIRA), introduced in the Sen-
ate by Senator Mendez on June 22, 2011.172  CIRA proposes solutions to
deal with the current undocumented alien population in a practical and
humane way and also takes economic factors into consideration.173  In
addition, the bill proposes a creation of a special committee comprised of
several government entities working together to analyze the economic
and labor force effects of immigration.174  The bill focuses on providing
amnesty to deserving undocumented aliens, enforcement, and employer
penalties for hiring undocumented workers.175  The bill also stresses the
importance of English proficiency, steady employment, and continuous
residency in the United States; the bill proposes funding for the program
through fees and fines.176  CIRA consists of two major parts: Title I: Im-
migration and Title II: Immigration Enforcement and Reform.177
i. CIRA Title I: Immigration
Title I of CIRA proposes registration of undocumented individuals and
reforms for worksite enforcement.178  The first section of Title I, Registra-
tion of Undocumented Immigrants, outlines guidelines for amnesty to un-
documented immigrants present in the United States before June 1,
2011.179  These immigrants will be labeled as “Lawful Prospective Immi-
172. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); Menendez Press Release, supra note 21.  Robert Mendez explained the meaning
behind the bill:
This legislation signals to the American people that we are serious about fixing our
broken immigration system.  We stand for a complete solution[—]a real solution[—]to
end undocumented immigration and restore the rule of law.  This is common-sense
legislation that addresses the realities of the situation, stops the flow across our bor-
ders, and contributes to our economic recovery.
Id.
173. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; Menendez Press Release,
supra note 21.
174. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, Menendez Press Release,
supra note 21.
175. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; Menendez Press Release,
supra note 21.
176. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; Menendez Press Release,
supra note 21.
177. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
178. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; Menendez Press Release,
supra note 21.
179. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
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grants” (LPI) and must meet stringent requirements to qualify.180  On top
of the general requirements for immigrants outlined in the Immigration
and Nationality Act,181 CIRA requires all immigrants must pass a back-
ground check.182  After meeting all the requirements and receiving LPI
status, which lasts for four years, the LPI will be eligible to apply for
permanent residency at the price of $1,000 and must wait six to eight
years.183  This means that it will take at least ten years before an undocu-
mented immigrant can qualify for the benefits afforded to permanent
residents.
In addition, the first section of Title I also incorporates the DREAM
Act and AgJOBS bill.184  Some forms of the DREAM Act have been
already enacted by individual states.185  For example, Texas Governor
Rick Perry signed the Texas DREAM Act into law in 2001.186  The Texas
version of the DREAM Act allows children of undocumented immigrants
who have resided in the United States and graduated from a U.S. high
school to pay in-state college tuition.187  The federal version of the
DREAM Act provides a path to naturalization for children of undocu-
mented immigrants.188  In order to qualify for permanent resident status
and eventually citizenship through the DREAM Act, the child must have
arrived in the United States as a minor, attended and graduated from a
U.S. high school, and met the residency requirement of five years.189  If
the legislature were to pass the DREAM Act the result would create a
180. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
181. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; Menendez Press Release,
supra note 21.
182. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
183. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
184. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
185. MYTHS & FACTS ABOUT THE DREAM ACT, U. S. STUDENT ASS’N 2 (2008),
available at http://www.usstudents.org/our-work/legislative/dream-act-factsheet (stating
that Illinois, New York, Utah, Kansas, Texas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, California, Washing-
ton, and New Mexico all have in state benefits for students who are in the United States as
undocumented aliens).
186. H.B. 1403, 77th Leg. Sess. (2001) (codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE § 54.051(m));
Mallie J. Kim, Rick Perry Stands by Texas DREAM Act, U.S. NEWS (July 25, 2011), http://
www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/07/25/rick-perry-stands-by-texas-dream-act.
187. Kim, supra note 186.
188. Development, Relief and Education of Alien Minors Act (DREAM ACT), H.R.
1842, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
189. Id.
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substantial taxable income for the U.S. economy.190  In addition, the
DREAM Act would cause a reduction in deficits by an estimated $1.4
billion and an increase in revenues estimated at $2.3 billion in the next
ten years.191
Another act previously introduced and incorporated into Title I of
CIRA is The Agricultural Job Opportunities, Benefits and Security Act
(AgJOBS).192  AgJOBS was introduced in 2009 but no compromise has
been reached to pass it into law; it provides a path to legal permanent
residency for immigrant farm workers.193  AgJOBS was a result of a com-
promise between the United Farm Workers and agricultural business em-
ployers.194  The bill provides an opportunity for undocumented
immigrants working in the agricultural field to pay into the system and
offset some of the major costs of illegal immigration.195
The second section of Title I, Worksite Enforcement, is aimed at dis-
couraging the use of fraudulent documentation and puts further responsi-
bilities on employers.196  The bill provides the necessary tools to
employers by implementing an employment verification system and ad-
ding criminal penalties for failure to comply.197  Since employment is one
of the major incentives for undocumented immigrants to come to the
United States, employers’ responsibility and compliance is crucial to im-
migration reform.198  The enforcement of employer’s compliance and
lack of an efficient verification system have been major downfalls of past
immigration reform.199  Employers simply did not have the proper tools
190. RAUL HINOJOSA-OJEDA ET AL., UCLA AM. INTEGRATION AND DEV. CTR., NO
DREAMERS LEFT BEHIND: THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF DREAM ACT BENEFICIARIES
2–3 (2010), available at http://naid.ucla.edu/uploads/4/2/1/9/4219226/no_dreamers_left_be-
hind.pdf (estimating a taxable income of $1.4 trillion to $3.6 trillion in the next forty years
as a result of DREAM Act).
191. JONATHAN MORANCY ET AL., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE: S. 3992
DEVELOPMENT, RELIEF, AND EDUCATION FOR ALIEN MINORS ACT OF 2010 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/119xx/doc11991/s3992.pdf.
192. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
193. AGJOBS–FARMWORKER JUSTICE BULL., SUMMARY OF AGJOBS: THE AGRICUL-




196. SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
197. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
198. COOPER & O’NEIL, supra 49 (explaining that over ninety percent of illegal male
immigrants are employed).
199. Id. at 3.
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to comply with prior legislative requirements.200  The new proposals in
CIRA should address the issue properly and correct the downfalls of past
legislation.
In summary, Title I of CIRA outlines the stringent requirements for
amnesty for over eleven million undocumented immigrants and in-
troduces a new system for preventing fraud in the workplace.201  CIRA’s
amnesty provision gives undocumented aliens an opportunity to offset
the major economic costs of immigration by letting them pay into the
system.202  Furthermore, the costs of this amnesty reform will be funded
by the undocumented immigrants themselves through application fees.203
CIRA’s amnesty will also eliminate deportation costs of millions of peo-
ple.204  This seems like the most economically sensible solution to the
problem of illegal immigration currently faced by the United States,205
and is the preferred solution of most economists.206  Although some ar-
gue that amnesty encourages unauthorized immigration, the addition of
CIRA’s Worksite Enforcement will deter future undocumented immi-
grants by making it harder for them to obtain employment.207
ii. CIRA Title II: Immigration Enforcement and Reform
Title II of CIRA outlines procedures for border enforcement, interior
enforcement, reforming America’s legal immigration system, and immi-
gration integration and other reforms.208  CIRA makes it clear that regu-
lating immigration is a function of the federal government, not individual
states.209  Title II proposes expansion Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and Immigrant and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agencies to en-
sure border enforcement.210  For internal enforcement, the bill expands
200. Id.
201. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
202. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
203. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, § 338; SHORT SUMMARY OF
MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
204. See SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35 (outlining am-
nesty options provided to immigrants under CIRA).
205. Bloomberg, supra note 8.
206. O’Connell, supra note 95.
207. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
208. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35
209. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
210. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
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penalties and provides new guidelines for agencies handling undocu-
mented immigrants.211  It is difficult to predict whether changes proposed
in Title II will have a significant impact on deterring unauthorized immi-
gration.  However, from an economic standpoint, it makes more sense to
allocate funds towards border and interior enforcement reform to pre-
vent future unwanted immigration than to deport such a large number of
people.212
Another key proposal of Title II is the creation of a Standing Commis-
sion on Immigration, Labor Markets, and the National Interests.213  This
commission will evaluate economic needs and impacts of immigration to
help prevent future downfalls.214  This commission is uniquely valuable
because it is to be comprised of representatives from numerous federal
agencies, including the Social Security Commissioner, the Secretary of
Commerce, and Department of Homeland Security.215  This will give a
picture of how the immigration system functions as a whole in conjunc-
tion with other agencies, instead of trying to piece together small
amounts of information to determine the economic impact of immigra-
tion.  Moreover, the commission will address the effect of increasing the
legal immigration quota.216  A higher legal immigration quota correlates
to a lower number of undocumented immigrants and vice versa.217  How-
ever, very few studies are currently available to determine the true eco-
nomic impact of a higher quota.
In summary, CIRA proposes an economically efficient way to deal with
undocumented aliens through amnesty, workforce regulations, border
and internal enforcement reforms.218  Even opponents of amnesty sup-
port other sections of CIRA.219  But if amnesty is replaced with the de-
portation of over eleven million people, as desired by the opponents of
211. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
212. O’Connell, supra note 95.
213. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
214. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
215. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
216. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
217. Infra Part IV.B.
218. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
219. See generally, Is the Legalization of Illegal Aliens a Good Solution to Illegal Im-
migration in America?, supra note 9 (discussing pro’s and con’s of amenesty).
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amnesty, the economic impact will be devastating.220  Both amnesty and
deportation will eliminate major costs of immigration such as healthcare
and education, but deportation will require even more funding, while am-
nesty will fund itself and allow the U.S. economy to retain the benefits of
millions of consumers.221
iii. Defining the Differences Between IRCA and CIRA
Opponents of amnesty argue that amnesty causes an increase in un-
documented immigration and backlogs in processing based on the failures
of IRCA.222  It is true that CIRA’s proposals are very similar to IRCA,223
and it is only natural to assume that the same type of legislation will cre-
ate the same type of effect.  However, there are significant differences
that would cause CIRA to have a substantially different economic impact
than IRCA.224
First, IRCA was designed for a population of approximately three mil-
lion undocumented immigrants in the United States in 1986.225  CIRA,
on the other hand, is designed to deal with the approximately eleven mil-
lion undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States.226
This is almost four times as many people, which creates an even stronger
economic impact.  Furthermore, one of the major downfalls of IRCA was
the lack of an efficient system to enforce fraud in the workplace.227  Em-
ployers themselves were responsible for verifying documents, but they
had no feasible way of actually doing so.  As a result, IRCA’s guidelines
for employers did not provide an efficient means of enforcement when
the guidelines were violated.228
IRRIRA attempted to correct this downfall in 1996 by imposing penal-
ties on employers; however, it still failed to prevent fraud and provide an
efficient means for employers to follow the guidelines.229  As a result,
220. O’Connell, supra note 95.
221. Id.
222. See Is the Legalization of Illegal Aliens a Good Solution to Illegal Immigration in
America?, supra note 9 (outlining con’s).
223. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
224. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986.
225. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; NORTH, supra note 159.
226. Menendez Press Release, supra note 21.
227. NORTH, supra note 159, at 4.
228. Id.
229. O’Connell, supra note 95; IIRIRA 96-A Summary of the New Immigration Bill,
VISALAW.COM, http://www.visalaw.com/96nov/3nov96.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
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unregistered immigrants still had an incentive to cross the border for em-
ployment which was easy for them to obtain under the IRRIRA.230
After IRRIRA, a pilot program was launched to provide a tool for
employers to check fraudulent documents.231  The program called eVerify
was launched in 1997 and became available to employers in 2001.232
Only about one thousand employers participated in the pilot program in
2001.233  As improvements were made to eVerify the number of employ-
ers participating also increased.234  Currently, there are over 300,000 em-
ployers participating in the program.235  Additonally, as the system keeps
improving and more employers begin participating, the number of errors
decrease.236  This is the type of efficient system CIRA is incorporating in
the bill.237  Unlike IRCA and IRRIRA, CIRA provides a tool that will
help employers follow guidelines, rather than simply setting guidelines
with no efficient means of following them.238
Finally, perhaps the most important difference between IRCA and
CIRA, is that CIRA provides more reforms for enforcement of immigra-
tion laws.239  IRCA was deemed a failure because of the influx of immi-
grants seeking amnesty.240  An increase in undocumented immigrant
population from three million to over eleven million is a failed attempt at
immigration reform.241  However, it is important to examine exactly why
IRCA failed.  The idea of IRCA looked great on paper but provided no
efficient means to turn the paper promise into reality.242  IRCA failed to
address the actual implementation of the bill and to foresee the effect it
230. O’Connell, supra note 95.
231. History and Milestones, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.–CITIZENSHIP AND IM-
MIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6
a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=84979589cdb76210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchan-





236. History and Milestones, supra note 231.
237. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
238. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
239. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
240. See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 85 (indicating that the only significant reversal
in the growing undocumented immigrant population occurred in 2010).
241. See id. (indicating the undocumented immigrant population reached twelve mil-
lion in 2007).
242. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 702, 100
Stat. 3359; COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49
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would have on enforcement agencies.243  For example, although there
was increased funding for border security under IRCA, border enforce-
ment continues to be inadequate and is unable to deter undocumented
immigrants.244  In order to solve a problem, only a plan is not enough.245
Proper implementation tools are key to executing any plan.
In order for CIRA to be more successful than IRCA, all the involved
government agencies must be prepared to properly execute CIRA as it
was written.246  Failure to execute was the primary reason IRCA was un-
successful, not because it was a bad plan.  That being said, CIRA has a
similar chance of failure if it is not properly executed.247  Although CIRA
does establish more guidelines for internal enforcement than IRCA and
provides tools, such as eVerify,248 it is hard to predict whether all of
CIRA’s guidelines will be enough to implement an efficient system of
immigration reform, but it is clearly an improvement from IRCA.249  In
order for CIRA to avoid the same downfall of IRCA, proper execution
and enforcement are necessary.  Success requires more than passing a bill
to solve the problem; it takes everyone involved, including all govern-
ment agencies, employers, and even the immigrants themselves.
Another negative effect of IRCA was the backlog of immigration ap-
plications because newly legalized immigrants were suddenly eligible to
bring their relatives into the United States legally.250  CIRA also fails to
address this issue.251  CIRA is targeted at about four times as many peo-
ple than IRCA, and the backlog can be expected to increase substan-
tially.252  CIRA fails to acknowledge and propose solutions for this
clearly inevitable effect of amnesty.253  IRCA’s failure leads to the con-
clusion that the idea of amnesty alone is not enough for efficient immi-
gration reform.  To accommodate the current and future possible
243. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49.
244. COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49, at 8.
245. Id. at 1.
246. Id. at 4–8.
247. Id. at 4.
248. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
249. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF ME-
NENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35 (detailing improved procedures for the enforcement of
immigration reform).
250. COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49, at 6.
251. SHORT SUMMARY OF MENENDEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
252. See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 85; NORTH, supra note 159 (indicating that al-
most three million undocumented immigrants benefitted from the amnesty provision of
IRCA).
253. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
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backlog, the legal immigration quota per year and per country must be
adjusted.254
CIRA partially addresses the issue of increasing the legal immigration
quota by creating a committee to analyze the need for an increasing im-
migration quota for employment visas.255  However, CIRA falls short of
being a complete and comprehensive immigration reform bill.  Based on
the effects of IRCA, the immigration backlog will inevitably increase sub-
stantially.256  Before implementing an immigration reform bill, future
foreseeable effects must be examined in order to avoid past mistakes.
IRCA failed to foresee future economic effects and CIRA fails in this
respect as well.257
Even putting the amnesty issue aside, the current backlog of immigra-
tion visas in the United States is unacceptable compared to other coun-
tries.  Countries with higher immigrant population percentages and
higher immigration quotas have a substantially lower processing time and
backlogs for visas.258  Furthermore, opponents of increasing the immigra-
tion quota in the United States argue that it will encourage more overall
immigration; however, statistics from other countries show that a higher
legal immigration quota corresponds to a much lower number of undocu-
mented immigrants.259  Not only will increasing the quota solve the back-
log, but it will also provide more legal paths for deserving immigrants to
migrate to the United States, fill up the demand for manual labor force in
a legal way, and in turn, reduce unauthorized immigration.260
254. Hearing on Comprehensive Immigration Reform Before the S Judiciary Comm.,
109th Cong. (July 26, 2005) (statement of Tamar Jacoby, Sr. Fellow, Manhattan Inst.),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476
862f735da10951ff&wit_id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da10951ff-2-2 [hereinafter Jacoby
Statement].  In her testimony Ms. Jacoby states that:
The problem is that our immigration quotas provide so few opportunities for most of
them to enter the country legally . . . there are only 5,000 visas available for unskilled
foreigners seeking year-round work.  A Mexican without family in the [United States],
who wants to do something other than farm work has virtually no legal way to enter
the country.  And even a man with family here must wait from [six] to [twenty-two]
years for a visa, depending on what kind of relatives he has and what their legal status
is.
Id.
255. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011; SHORT SUMMARY OF MENEN-
DEZ CIRA BILL, supra note 35.
256. See COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49 (explaining the increase in immigration
backlogs following the implementation of IRCA).
257. See COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 49 (detailing the lessons learned from IRCA).
258. Infra Part IV.B.
259. Id.
260. Jacoby Statement, supra note 254.  “We need the labor; foreign workers want the
jobs.  But there are no legal channels – so inevitably people come illegally.  And it is this
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B. Increasing Legal Immigration Quotas
The majority of undocumented immigrants enter the United States for
employment, and since there is always a demand for manual labor, un-
documented immigrants will always have an incentive to cross the bor-
der.261  Decreasing this incentive would be the most effective way to
prevent unauthorized immigration.262  Undoubtedly, decreasing the de-
mand for labor is not a practical solution in the midst of the current eco-
nomic crisis.  An increase in the immigration quota will satisfy the
demand for much needed manual labor jobs through a legal channel,
rather than the current system of satisfying the demand with undocu-
mented immigrants.263
Compared to immigration systems in other countries, such as Canada
and United Kingdom, the statistics are troublesome.  According to the
2010 Census, the United States net migration rate is four per 1,000 popu-
lation,264 while Canada’s rate is six per 1,000 population265 and United
Kingdom is at a mere three per 1,000.266  This means that the number of
people leaving and entering each country yearly is very close.  The United
Kingdom’s estimated migration rate in 2010 was 163,000 people,267 esti-
mated at 0.26 percent of the total U.K. population.268  In contrast, the
U.S’s quota is estimated at 0.16 percent of the total U.S. population.269
mismatch – the mismatch between the size of the flow and our quotas – that creates most
of the problems we associate with immigration.” Id.
261. Id.
262. Bloomberg, supra note 8.
263. Michele Waslin, The Nat’l Council of La Raza, speech delivered at the 2004
Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Immigration Reform: Comprehensive
Solutions for Complex Problems 9–10 (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter Waslin] (available at http://
lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2004/files/WaslinMichele_xCD.
pdf).  Noted Scholar Michael A. Olivas agrees with this premise and argues that the quotas
assigned to Mexico are unrealistic.  Michael A. Olivas, Keynote Speech at The Scholar: St.
Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues, Immigration Symposium, Mar. 2, 2012.
264. International Data Base, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/international/data/idb/country.php (last revised June 27, 2011) (enter “United States,”
select “2010” under year).
265. Id. (enter “Canada,” select “2010” under year) (Net Migration Rate defined as
“[t]he difference between the number of migrants entering and those leaving a country in a
year, per 1,000 midyear population”).
266. Id. (enter “United Kingdom,” select “2010” under year).
267. David Stringer, UK Warned Immigration Quota Could Dent Growth, BLOOM-
BERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 25, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9H634200.htm.
268. International Data Base, supra note 264 (enter “United Kingdom,” select “2010”
under year) (percentage calculated based on total population of 62,348,000 in 2010).
269. Id. (enter “United States,” select “2010” under year) (percentage calculated
based on total population of 308,282,000 in 2010).
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The United States has the lowest percentage of immigrants allowed per
population and by far the highest percentage of undocumented immi-
grants, estimated at 3.7 percent of the total population.270  For example,
the U.K.’s undocumented immigrant population was 1.21 percent in
2006271 three times lower than in the United States.
Yet some opponents to increasing the legal immigration quota argue
that in order to decrease unauthorized immigration, the legal immigra-
tion quota must also be decreased.272  To support their argument, these
opponents present evidence that all immigrant populations have in-
creased since the 1960s.273  This trend in numbers causes opponents to
come to a conclusion that documented immigration directly causes un-
documented immigration.274  Concluding that reducing the legal immi-
gration quota will reduce non-legal immigration would require a
multitude of connecting links to make a full chain of cause and effect.
Opponents of increasing the immigration quota fail to explain how the
root causes of unauthorized immigration lead to the conclusion that de-
creasing the legal immigration quota will solve the problem.
1. Historical Trends
In order to determine the true impact of the legal immigration quota
on the undocumented immigrant population, it is important to examine
historical trends in the United States.  The first immigration law in the
United States, The Page Act, was passed in 1875, and created basic guide-
lines for immigration.275  Quota for annual immigration was first estab-
lished by the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 at three percent of the
population of an immigrant’s native country that was residing in the
United States at the time of the 1910 census.276  The immigration quota
270. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 85
271. Dominic Casciani, An Illegal Immigration Amnesty?, BBC NEWS (June 14, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4989874.stm; International Data Base, supra
note 264 (enter “United Kingdom,” select “2006” under year) (percentage calculated
based on total population of 60,847,000).
272. JAMES R. EDWARDS JR., CNTR. ON IMMIGRATION STUDIES, TWO SIDES OF THE
SAME COIN: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 14 (Feb.
2006), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back106.pdf.
273. Mark Kirkorian, The Link: Legal and Illegal Immigration, CNTR. FOR IMMIGR.
STUDIES, http://www.cis.org/Link-Legal%2526IllegalImmigration (last visited Feb. 15,
2012) (reprinting an article appearing on Feb. 16, 1997 in the New York Post).
274. Id.
275. Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477; Historical Timeline: History of Legal and
Illegal Immigration in the United States, PROCON.ORG, http://immigration.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourceID=002690 (last updated May 27, 2011).
276. Emergency Quota Act of 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5; HANNIBAL GERALD
DUNCAN, IMMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION 497 (1933). In addition, not more than twenty
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was reduced to two percent by The Immigration Act of 1924 and addi-
tional restrictions were placed on the origins of those immigrants.277  In
addition, border security and patrol was implemented to prevent unau-
thorized immigration.278  Three years after the decrease in the legal immi-
gration quota, the undocumented immigrant population of Mexican
natives in the United States spiked to an estimated one million individu-
als.279  In response, Mexican immigration became even more restricted by
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and border patrol was fur-
ther expanded.280  By the 1980s, almost twenty years after restrictions on
legal Mexican immigration, the United States was faced with a need for
immigration reform due to the almost three million unauthorized immi-
grants that had entered the country.281  Decreasing the legal immigration
quota led to an increase in illegal immigration, despite the newly imple-
mented border patrol program that began in 1924.282  This trend shows
that as the U.S. legislature was restricting legal paths for immigrants to
percent of the quota could enter the United States in one month. DUNCAN, supra.  The
effect of the law was two-fold: first, it reduced the number of immigrants coming into the
country by more than half, and second, it encouraged immigration from Protestant North-
west Europeans. Id.
277. The Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(a) 43 Stat. 153 (repealed in 1965).
278. The Immigration Act of 1924: Historical Timeline: History of Legal and Illegal
Immigration in the United States, supra note 275.
279. LINNA E. BRESETTE, MEXICANS IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF A BRIEF
SURVEY 7 (1929). The report discusses Department of Labor statistics which estimated
that in just Texas, California, New Mexico, Colorado and Arizona alone there were 1.2
million Mexicans.  Id.  It further stated that Mexican nationals were no longer confined to
the Southwest and could be found in almost all states. Id.
280. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 21, 79 Stat. 911,
920; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service-Populating a Nation: A History of Immi-
gration and Naturalization, CPB.GOV, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/legacy/
ins_history.xml (last visited Feb, 8, 2012) [hereinafter A History of Immigration and Natu-
ralization].  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 expanded the responsibili-
ties of the Border Patrol, turning it into a modern-day law-enforcement agency. Id. The
official history of the Border Patrol states that:
The numbers of illegal migrants entering the country was growing at an alarming rate,
especially in the California and Rio Grande Valley areas along the Mexican border.
Citizen groups alleged that these migrants were responsible for the growing violent
crime rate and implored the Immigration Service to put a stop to their entry.  The
Patrol responded by moving resources-sixty-two Canadian border units were trans-
ferred south for a large-scale repatriation effort.  In 1952, the government airlifted
52,000 illegal immigrants back to the Mexican interior.
U.S. Border Patrol-Protecting Our Sovereign Borders, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/
history/legacy/bp_historcut.xml (last visited Feb. 8, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Border Patrol].
281. Historical Timeline: History of Legal and Illegal Immigration in the United States,
supra note 275.
282. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911; A
History of Immigration and Naturalization, supra note 275.
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enter the United States, unauthorized immigration substantially
increased.
The quota failed to grow across the decades and failed to keep up with
our economic demands.  There are many factors that lead to an increase
in unauthorized immigration, but it is difficult to separate the impact a
decrease in the immigration quota has on this influx of undocumented
immigrants.  Nevertheless, it is clear from the past that after a decrease in
the legal immigration quota, unauthorized immigration does not necessa-
rily decrease, but instead tends to increase.  Those who oppose increasing
the immigration quota argue that lowering the legal immigration quota
will cause unauthorized immigration to decline, but history has proven
the exact opposite to be true.283  In fact, other countries that have a sub-
stantially high legal immigration quotas have a substantially lower un-
documented immigrant population.284
In order to discourage future flows of undocumented immigrants, the
true reasons behind unauthorized immigration must be addressed.285
Putting a patch on the wound is not enough to make it heal properly.
Undocumented immigrants come to the United States for jobs.286  In fact,
this incentive is so strong, that it overpowers the risks of strict punish-
Laws passed in 1921 and 1924 limited the numbers of newcomers by assigning a quota
to each nationality based upon its representation in previous U.S. census figures.
Each year, the State Department issued a limited number of visas; only those immi-
grants who had obtained them and could present valid visas were permitted entry.
A corollary to severely restricted legal immigration is increased illegal immigration.
So the quota-visa policy led to many of the immigration challenges that we see today.
Illegal entries and alien smuggling began to rise along land borders, so Congress cre-
ated the Border Patrol, in 1924, within the Immigration Service.  Stricter immigration
policies coupled with Border Patrol apprehensions meant that agency staff and re-
sources were becoming more heavily involved in deportations.  And a corollary of
deportations was that more aliens were conducting more court battles in order to stay.
A History of Immigration and Naturalization, supra note 280.  Congress established the
United States Border Patrol as part of the Immigration Bureau the patrol areas were ex-
panded in 1925 to include over 2,000 miles of seacoast extending along the Gulf and Flor-
ida coasts. U.S. Border Patrol, supra note 280.
283. Would an Increase in Immigration Quotas Reduce Illegal Immigration?,
PROCON.ORG, http://immigration.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000762 (last
updated Sept. 7, 2010); Historical Timeline: History of Legal and Illegal Immigration in the
United States, PROCON.ORG, http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resource
ID=002690 (last updated May 27, 2011).
284. Supra Part IV.B.
285. Waslin, supra note 263.
286. See JEFFERY S. PASSEL ET AL., UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: FACTS AND
FIGURES, URBAN INSTITUTION IMMIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAM 1 (2004), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf (indicating that
ninety-six percent of undocumented male immigrants were actively participating in the
workforce).
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ment and the obstacles surrounding a secure border.287  The demand for
manual labor in the U.S. workforce will always exist.288  It would be more
economically beneficial to fulfill this demand through legal channels
rather than illegal, and un-taxable, means.289
Opponents of increasing the legal immigration quota argue that immi-
grants will take away jobs from Americans.290  There are two parts to this
argument: (1) undocumented immigrants currently in the United States
take away jobs from lower class Americans, and (2) legal immigrants take
away higher skilled jobs.291  With a historically high number of unem-
ployed individuals and the current economic crisis, the undocumented
immigrant population often becomes an easy scapegoat.  In order to de-
termine the validity and true economic impact of these arguments, real
life statistics and factors must be taken into consideration.
2. Immigration Effects on the Labor Force
There is a general misconception among Americans that immigrants
take away Americans’ jobs and drain the welfare system.292  The reality is
there is little research to support such claims.293  In order to determine
the validity of such statements, it is helpful to compare an immigrant to
an unemployed U.S. born citizen on welfare.
Welfare benefits translate into an hourly wage higher than a janitor’s
wage in forty-seven states.294  Why would an unemployed American ever
want to work as a janitor?  In New York City, the average “welfare sal-
ary” is calculated at $14.75 per hour.295  A first-year, college-educated
287. Bloomberg, supra note 8.
288. Id.
289. Jacoby Statement, supra note 254.
290. PEW HISPANIC CNTR., THE STATE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRA-
TION IN SPRING 2006: A REVIEW OF MAJOR SURVEYS 3 (May 2006), available at http://
www.pewhispanic.org/files/2011/10/18.pdf [hereinafter STATE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPIN-
ION].  In 2006 fifty-two percent of Americans felt that immigrants are a burden on the
country because they “they take our jobs, housing and health care.” Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Are American workers harmed (such as through job displacement or lower wages)
by an illegal alien workforce?, PROCON.ORG, http://immigration.procon.org/view.answers.
php?questionID=000852 (last updated April 14, 2009) ( “The best available evidence does
not support the view that large waves of immigrants in the past have had a detrimental
effect on the labor market opportunities of natives, including the less skilled and minori-
ties.  Any claim that increased immigration . . . will necessarily reduce the wages of incum-
bent workers should be viewed as speculation with little solid research support.”).
294. CATO INSTITUTE, WELFARE PAYS BETTER THAN WORK, STUDY FINDS (Nov./
Dec. 1995), available at http://www.cato.org/research/pr-nd-st.html.
295. Id.
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teacher makes less than a person on welfare in nine states.296  A secretary
makes less than a person on welfare in twenty-nine states.297  The average
welfare salary is over $8 per hour in forty states.298
In contrast, many undocumented immigrants work under false docu-
ments and some pay into the welfare system without having any access to
the benefits.299  They are not taking away jobs, they are filling essential
positions in the U.S. labor force that no one else has the desire to fill.300
As a result, the undocumented alien labor force provides lower consumer
prices for all Americans.301  As long as there is an inexpensive alien labor
force, socieo-economically disadvantaged Americans are deterred to
work unskilled jobs.
As far as the argument that undocumented immigrants are taking away
Americans’ jobs, it is hard to believe that the employment based visa
limit of 140,000 per year302 would hardly have any significant impact.  The
natural functioning of the employment market is the reason many skilled
workers are unemployed, not the high number of immigrants.303  Even if
the undocumented immigrants are given a chance to legalize and have the
same opportunities as most Americans, such as higher education, they
will still have more obstacles to overcome when getting a job than an
average American.  For example, the language barrier and lack of experi-
ence in a U.S. employment environment will still be a disadvantage when
competing for skilled jobs.
Perhaps the biggest concern should not be losing jobs to undocu-
mented and documented immigrants, but rather losing jobs to workers




299. Editorial, supra note 88.
300. Greenspan, supra note 93.
301. HINOJOSA-OJEDA, supra note 146.
302. Visa Availability and Priority Dates, supra note 80.
303. DAVID A. JAEGER, CNTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, REPLACING THE UNDOCU-
MENTED WORKFORCE 1 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/un-
documented_workforce.pdf.  The report states that:
While we find that, overall, there are enough out-of-work natives to replace undocu-
mented workers, there is a severe mismatch between the skills of undocumented
workers and the natives who would potentially replace them.  Moreover . . . all out-of-
work natives would not otherwise find work.  Clearly, a certain share of natives are
unemployed due to the normal functioning of the labor market (socalled ‘frictional’
unemployment) and will find work regardless of what happens with undocumented
workers . . . .”
Id.
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the United States in the past ten years.304  Those are jobs going to people
who do not consume or pay taxes in the United States.  It makes more
sense economically to give those jobs to people who live in the United
States, consume, and pay into the system.
In order to find a more economically efficient solution to immigration
problems today, it is important to consider both the current status and the
future of the U.S. economy.  Deportation will cause an economic disaster;
therefore, amnesty is the only viable solution.305  Learning from the past,
it is clear that amnesty alone is not enough, and the future effects of am-
nesty must be addressed.306  Amnesty coupled with an increase in the
legal immigration quota have proven to cause a low undocumented immi-
grant population in other countries, while a decrease in a legal immigra-
tion quota has proven to cause an increase in the undocumented
immigrant population in the United States in the past.307  Therefore, it
would be best to increase the legal immigration quota.
V. PRESENT, PAST, AND FUTURE IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY
Undocumented immigrants did break a law; they broke a law once they
crossed the border of the United States.  How does everyone else, an
average American, get the right to be present in the United States?  They
get the right simply by being born in the United States.  How does an
immigrant get the right to be in the United States?  By going through an
arduous and expensive process of proving they are worthy of becoming a
U.S. citizen.
The “illegal is illegal” argument that is often used to approach immi-
gration today was used on numerous civil rights issues throughout U.S.
history.  For instance, it was once illegal for a Black person to marry a
White person.308  It seems absurd today that an interracial marriage was
once considered a criminal offense.  The fact that something is labeled
“illegal” is not justification to ignore the big picture and close one’s eyes
to what is truly behind that word.  Not all “illegal” things are equal, and,
therefore, they must be addressed with an open and informed mind.  The
future of the immigration system in the United States is unclear.  What is
304. Zaid Jilani, CHART: Top ‘U.S.’ Corporations Outsourced More Than 2.4 Million
American Jobs Over The Last Decade, THINKPROGRESS (April 19, 2011), http://think-
progress.org/economy/2011/04/19/159555/us-corporations-outsourced-americans/.
305. Supra Part IV.A.
306. Supra Parts IV.A, B.
307. Id.
308. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a Virginia statute
banning interracial marriage violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment).
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clear is that the current immigration system is not working.  Effective im-
migration reform must take into consideration the present state of the
economy, past failures, and the future impact of such reform.
A. Fixing the Present
As previously stated, there are currently an estimated eleven to twelve
million undocumented immigrants, or 3.7 percent of the population, in
the United States today.309  The legal immigration quota in the U.S. is
only 0.16 percent of the total population.310  The waiting list to enter the
United States as a legal permanent resident is over ten years.311  Un-
doubtedly, the current immigration system in the United States is in dire
need of reform.  In the midst of a current economic crisis, economic fac-
tors are perhaps the most important to examine when drafting immigra-
tion reform.
The current undocumented immigrant population brings both signifi-
cant benefits and costs to the U.S. economy.  The proper immigration
reform should offset major costs of the undocumented immigrant popula-
tion, such as healthcare and education, while preserving the major bene-
fits, such as consumption and tax revenue.312  The bottom line is that the
only two options to deal with the high number of undocumented immi-
grants in the United States today are deportation and amnesty.  Deporta-
tion, even if deemed realistic for eleven to twelve million people, will cost
$12,500 per person.313  Amnesty, on the other hand, will offset major
costs while retaining the benefits.314
B. Learning from the Past
It seems natural to be skeptical of amnesty based on prior failures of
IRCA.  But most critics of IRCA agree that the failure was in implemen-
tation and planning for the future, not the actual granting of amnesty.
Further attempts to correct IRCA with IIRIRA in 1996 by implementing
stricter punishments on employers and immigrants have also failed be-
cause the root causes of illegal immigration were overlooked.  The past
shows that a decrease in the immigration quota has led to a spike in ille-
gal immigration.  An analysis of reasons for past failure is key to creating
effective immigration reform in the future.
309. Supra Part IV.B.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Supra Part III.B.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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C. Preparing for the Future
Attempting to learn from the past, the current proposal for immigra-
tion reform, CIRA, addresses some failures; however, it still overlooks
future effects.  Amnesty alone, even if properly implemented, will not
address the future flow of immigrants.  A higher legal immigration quota
is directly tied to a low number of undocumented immigrants.  Immi-
grants do not take away jobs from Americans; they contribute to eco-
nomic growth and development, unlike the 2.4 million jobs currently
outsourced to other countries.  To prepare for the future, the effects of
amnesty or deportation on the U.S. economy must be considered.
Is it even realistic to make over eleven million people, as many as the
entire state of Pennsylvania, disappear?  As people suddenly began disap-
pearing in Central Falls, Rhode Island, the negative economic impact was
clearly felt by small businesses in that town because of the reduction in
consumption.  Is Central Falls a small scale example of what the United
States will become once millions of consumers also disappear?  Why is
the U.S. government trying so hard and spending billions of dollars to
cause “the worst economic disaster in the history of the United
States?”315  The only economically sensible and realistic paths to avoiding
this disaster are granting amnesty to current undocumented immigrants
and increasing immigration quotas.  Perhaps the U.S. government can
learn their lesson from the small scale example of Central Falls and dis-
continue current immigration procedures.
315. O’Connell, supra note 95.

